The collapse of 'world order' as an opportunity for Asia?

The erosion of the post-Cold War international order, accelerated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the United States’ unpredictable foreign policy under former President Donald Trump, has left many nations reassessing their place in a world where rules and alliances feel increasingly fragile. This shift is particularly consequential for Asia, where rising powers like China, India, and ASEAN members are navigating a geopolitical landscape that no longer guarantees stability or predictability. The breakdown of established norms—whether in trade, security, or human rights—creates both risks and opportunities, forcing Asian capitals to reconsider their strategies in an era where traditional alliances and institutions are under strain. Historically, Asia’s engagement with the global order has been shaped by its economic rise and the legacy of colonialism, which left many nations wary of Western-dominated frameworks. The Cold War’s bipolar structure further complicated the region’s alignment, with nations like Japan and South Korea aligning with the U.S. while others, such as India and Indonesia, pursued non-alignment. Today, as the U.S. under Trump withdrew from key treaties like the Paris Agreement and the Iran nuclear deal, while also challenging NATO and the WTO, Asian powers are less certain about the reliability of Western-led institutions. China, meanwhile, has aggressively promoted alternatives like the Belt and Road Initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, positioning itself as a counterweight to traditional Western dominance. The question now is whether Asia can capitalize on this moment of flux. Some nations may seek to fill the void left by eroding global governance, but doing so requires balancing competing interests—economic ties with China, security partnerships with the U.S., and the need for regional cohesion. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has long championed a rules-based order, but its ability to mediate between great powers is tested by internal divisions and external pressures. Meanwhile, middle powers like Japan and Australia are recalibrating their foreign policies, investing in minilateral groupings such as AUKUS and the Quad to hedge against uncertainty. The coming years will reveal whether Asia can construct a new order—or whether the collapse of the old one simply ushers in a more fragmented, less cooperative world. The stakes are high: without clear norms, smaller nations risk being squeezed between competing powers, while great powers may find their ambitions constrained by the very instability they helped create.